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Abstract
We study a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where agents’ beliefs are
strategy dependent, i.e. signaling occurs. We show that the notion of sufficient information, introduced
in the companion paper [2], can be used to effectively compress the agents’ information in a mutually
consistent manner that is sufficient for decision-making purposes. We present instances of dynamic
games with asymmetric information where we can characterize a time-invariant information state for
each agent. Based on the notion of sufficient information, we define a class of equilibria for dynamic
games called Sufficient Information Based Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (SIB-PBE). Utilizing the notion
of SIB-PBE, we provide a sequential decomposition of dynamic games with asymmetric information
over time; this decomposition leads to a dynamic program that determines SIB-PBE of dynamic games.
Furthermore, we provide conditions under which we can guarantee the existence of SIB-PBE.
I. INTRODUCTION
We study a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information. We
consider a setting where the underlying system has Markovian dynamics controlled by the agents’
joint actions at every time. The instantaneous utility of each agent depends on the agents’ joint
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2actions and the system state. At every time, each agent makes a private noisy observation that
depends on the current system state and the agents’ past actions. Therefore, at every time agents
have asymmetric and imperfect information about the history of the game. Furthermore, the
information that an agent possesses about the history of the game at each time instant depends
on the other agents’ past actions and strategies; this phenomenon is known as signaling among the
agents. Moreover, at each time, each agent’s strategy depend on his information about the current
system state and the other agents’ strategies. Therefore, the agents’ decisions and information
are coupled and interdependent over time.
There are three main challenges in the study of dynamic games with asymmetric information.
First, since the agents’ decisions and information are interdependent and coupled over time, we
need to determine the agents’ strategies simultaneously for all times. Second, the agents’ strategy
domains grow over time as they acquire more information. Third, in contrast to dynamic teams
where agents coordinate their strategies, in dynamic games each agent’s strategy is his private
information as he chooses it individually so as to maximize his utility. Therefore, in dynamic
games each agent needs to form a belief about other agents’ strategies as well as about the game
history.
In this paper, we propose a general approach for the study of a dynamic games with asymmetric
information that addresses the stated-above challenges. We build our approach based on notion
of sufficient information, introduced in the companion paper [2], and define a class of sufficient
information based assessments, where strategic agents compress their information in a mutually
consistent manner that is sufficient for decision-making purposes. Accordingly, we propose the
notion of Sufficient Information Based Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (SIB-PBE) for dynamic
games that characterizes a set of equilibrium outcomes. Using the notion of SIB-PBE, we provide
a sequential decomposition of the game over time, and formulate a dynamic program that enables
us to compute the set of SIB-PBEs via backward induction. We discover specific instances of
dynamic games where we can determine a set of information states for the agents that have
time-invariant domain. We determine conditions that guarantee the existence of SIB-PBEs. We
discuss the relation between the class of SIB-PBE and PBE in dynamic games, and argue that
the class of SIB-PBE provides a simpler and more robust set of equilibria than PBE that are
consistent with agents’ rationality.
The notion of SIB-PBE we introduce in this paper provides a generalization/extension of
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) to dynamic games with asymmetric information. The authors
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3in [3] introduce the notion of Markov Perfect Equilibrium that characterizes a subset of Subgame
Perfect Equilibria (SPE) for dynamic games with symmetric information and provide a sequential
decomposition of the game over time. Moreover, our results, along with those in the companion
paper [2], provide a unified approach to the study of dynamic decision problems with asymmetric
information and strategic or nonstrategic agents.
A. Related Literature
Dynamic games with asymmetric information have been investigated extensively in literature
in the context of repeated games; see [4]–[7] and the references therein. The key feature of
these games is the absence of a dynamic system. Moreover, the works on repeated games study
primarily their asymptotic properties when the horizon is infinite and agents are sufficiently
patient (i.e. the discount factor is close one). In repeated games, agents play a stage (static)
game repeatedly over time. As a result, the decision making problem that each agent faces is
very simple. The main objective of this strand of literature is to explore situations where agents
can form self-enforcing punishment/reward mechanisms so as to create additional equilibria that
improve upon the payoffs agents can get by simply playing an equilibrium of the stage game over
time. Recent works (see [8]–[10]) adopt approaches similar to those used in repeated games to
study infinite horizon dynamic games with asymmetric information when there is an underlying
dynamic Markovian system. Under certain conditions on the system dynamics and information
structure, the authors of [8]–[10] characterize a set of asymptotic equilibria when the agents are
sufficiently patient.
The problem we study in this paper is different from the ones in [4]–[10] in two aspects. First,
we consider a class of dynamic games where the underlying system has a general Markovian
dynamics and a general information structure, and we do not restrict attention to asymptotic
behaviors when the horizon is infinite and the agents are sufficiently patient. Second, we study
situations where the decision problem that each agent faces, in the absence of strategic interac-
tions with other agents, is a Partially Observed Markov Decision Process (POMDP), which is
a complex problem to solve by itself. Therefore, reaching (and computing) a set of equilibrium
strategies, which take into account the strategic interactions among the agents, is a very chal-
lenging task. As a result, it is not very plausible for the agents to seek reaching an equilibria
that is generated by the formation of self-enforcing punishment/reward mechanisms similar to
those used in infinitely repeated games (see Section VII for more discussion). We believe that
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4our results provide new insight into the behavior of strategic agents in complex and dynamic
environments, and complement the existing results in the repeated games literature with simple
and (mostly) static environments.
The works in [11]–[14] consider dynamic zero-sum games with asymmetric information. The
authors of [11], [12] study zero-sum games with Markovian dynamics and lack of information
on one side (i.e. one informed player and one uninformed player). The authors of [13], [14]
study zero-sum games with Markovian dynamics and lack of information on both sides. The
problem that we study in this paper is different from the ones in [11]–[14] in three aspects.
First, we study a general class of dynamic games that include dynamic zero-sum games with
asymmetric information as a special case. Second, we consider a general Markovian dynamics for
the underlying system whereas the authors of [11]–[14] consider a specific Markovian dynamics
where each agent observes perfectly a local state that evolves independently of the other local
states conditioned on the agents’ observable actions. Third, we consider a general information
structure that allows us to capture scenarios with unobservable actions and imperfect observations
that are not captured in [11]–[14].
The problems investigated in [15]–[20] are the most closely related to our problem. The authors
of [15], [16] study a class of dynamic games where the agents’ common information based belief
(defined in [15]) is independent of their strategies; that is, there is no signaling among them.
This property allows them to apply ideas from the common information approach developed
in [21], [22], and define an equivalent dynamic game with symmetric information among the
fictitious agents. Consequently, they characterize a class of equilibria for dynamic games called
Common Information based Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Our results are different from those in
[15], [16] in two aspects. First, we consider a general class of dynamic games where the agents’
CIB beliefs are strategy-dependent, thus, signaling is present. Second, the proposed approach
in [15], [16] requires the agents to keep track of all of their private information over time. We
propose an approach to effectively compress the agents’ private information, and consequently,
reduce the number of variables on which the agents need to form CIB beliefs.
The authors of [17]–[20] study a class of dynamic games with asymmetric information
where signaling occurs. When the horizon in finite, the authors of [17], [18] introduce the
notion of Common Information Based Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, and provide a sequential
decomposition of the game over time. The authors of [19], [20] extend the results of [17], [18]
to finite horizon Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) dynamic games and infinite horizon dynamic
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5games, respectively. The class of dynamic games studied in [17]–[20] satisfies the following
assumptions: (i) agents’ actions are observable (ii) each agent has a perfect observation of his
own local states/type (iii) conditioned on the agents’ actions, the evolution of the local states
are independent.
We relax assumptions (i)-(iii) of [17]–[20], and study a general class of dynamic games with
asymmetric information, hidden actions, imperfect observations, and controlled and coupled
dynamics. As a result, each agent needs to form a belief about the other agents’ past actions
and private (imperfect) observations. Moreover, in contrast to [17]–[20], an agent’s, say agent
i’s, belief about the system state and the other agents’ private information is his own private
information and is different from the CIB belief. In this paper, we extend the methodology
developed in [17], [18] for dynamic games, and generalize the notion of CIB-PBE. Furthermore,
we propose an approach to effectively compress the agents’ private information and obtain the
results of [17]–[20] as special cases.
B. Contribution
We develop a general methodology for the study and analysis of dynamic games with asym-
metric information, where the information structure is non-classical; that is, signaling occurs.
We propose an approach to characterize a set of information states that effectively compress
the agents’ private and common information in a mutually consistent manner. We characterize a
subclass of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, called SIB-PBE, and provide a sequential decomposition
of these games over time. This decomposition provides a backward induction algorithm to
determine the set of SIB-PBEs. We discover special instances of dynamic games where we
can identify a set of information states with time-invariant domain. We provide conditions that
guarantee the existence of SIB-PBEs in dynamic games with asymmetric information. We show
that the methodology developed in this paper generalizes the existing results on dynamic games
with non-classical information structure.
C. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe our model. In Section
III, we discuss the main issues that arise in the study of dynamic games with asymmetric
information. We provide the formal definition of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Section IV. In
Section V, we describe the sufficient information approach to dynamic games with asymmetric
information and introduce the notion of Sufficient Information Based (SIB) assessment and
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6SIB-PBE. In Section VI, we present our main results and provide a sequential decomposition of
dynamic games over time. We discuss our results in Section VII, and compare the notion of SIB-
PBE with other equilibrium concepts..In Section VIII, we determine conditions that guarantee the
existence of SIB-PBE in dynamic games with asymmetric information. We conclude in Section
IX. The proofs of all the theorems and lemmas appear in the Appendix.
Remark 1. Section I-D on notation and Section V-A on the definition of sufficient private
information are similar to the ones appearing in the companion paper [23]; moreover, the
model presented in Section II with strategic agents is similar to that of the companion paper
[23] with non-strategic agents. All these sections are included in this paper for ease of reading
and to make the paper self-contained.
D. Notation
Random variables are denoted by upper case letters, their realizations by the corresponding
lower case letters. In general, subscripts are used as time index while superscripts are used to
index agents. For t1≤ t2, Xt1:t2 (resp. ft1:t2(·)) is the short hand notation for the random variables
(Xt1 ,Xt1+1, ...,Xt2) (resp. functions (ft1(·), . . . ,ft2(·))). When we consider a sequence of random
variables (resp. functions) for all time, we drop the subscript and use X to denote X1:T (resp.
f(·) to denote f1:T (·)). For random variables X1t , . . . ,XNt (resp. functions f 1t (·), . . . ,fNt (·)),
we use Xt := (X1t , . . . ,X
N
t ) (resp. ft(·) := (f 1t (·), . . . ,fNt (·))) to denote the vector of the set
of random variables (resp. functions) at t, and X−nt := (X1t , . . . ,X
n−1
t ,X
n+1
t , . . . ,X
N
t ) (resp.
f−nt (·) :=(f 1t (·), . . . ,fn−1t (·),fn+1t (·), . . . ,fNt (·))) to denote all random variables (resp. functions)
at t except that of the agent indexed by n. P{·} and E{·} denote the probability and expectation
of an event and a random variable, respectively. For a set X , ∆(X ) denotes the set of all
beliefs/distributions on X . For random variables X, Y with realizations x,y, P{x|y} :=P{X =
x|Y =y} and E{X|y} :=E{X|Y =y}. For a strategy g and a belief (probability distribution) pi,
we use Pgpi{·} (resp. Egpi{·}) to indicate that the probability (resp. expectation) depends on the
choice of g and pi. We use 1{X=x} to denote the indicator function for event X=x. For sets A
and B we use A\B to denote all elements in set A that are not in set B.
II. MODEL
1) System dynamics: There are N strategic agents who live in a dynamic Markovian world
over horizon T :={1, 2, ..., T}, T <∞. Let Xt∈Xt denote the state of the world at t∈T . At time
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7t, each agent, indexed by i∈N := {1, 2, ..., N}, chooses an action ait ∈Ait, where Ait denotes
the set of available actions to him at t. Given the collective action profile At :=(A1t , ..., A
N
t ), the
state of the world evolves according to the following stochastic dynamic equation,
Xt+1 = ft(Xt, At,W
x
t ), (1)
where W x1:T−1 is a sequence of independent random variables. The initial state X1 is a random
variable that has a probability distribution η ∈ ∆(X1) with full support.
At every time t ∈ T , before taking an action, agent i receives a noisy private observation
Y it ∈ Y it of the current state of the world Xt and the action profile At−1, given by
Y it = O
i
t(Xt, At−1,W
i
t ), (2)
where W i1:T , i ∈ N , are sequences of independent random variables. Moreover, at every t ∈ T ,
all agents receive a common observation Zt ∈ Zt of the current state of the world Xt and the
action profile At−1, given by
Zt = O
c
t (Xt, At−1,W
c
t ), (3)
where W c1:T , is a sequence of independent random variables. We note that the agents’ actions
At−1 is commonly observable at t if At−1 ⊆ Zt. We assume that the random variables X1,
W x1:T−1, W
c
1:T , and W
i
1:T , i ∈ N are mutually independent.
2) Information structure: Let Ht ∈ Ht denote the aggregate information of all agents at time
t. Assuming that agents have perfect recall, we have Ht = {Z1:t, Y 1:N1:t , A1:N1:t−1}, i.e. Ht denotes
the set of all agents’ past observations and actions. The set of all possible realizations of the
agents’ aggregate information is given by Ht :=
∏
τ≤tZτ ×
∏
i∈N
∏
τ≤t Y iτ ×
∏
i∈N
∏
τ<tAiτ .
At time t∈T , the aggregate information Ht is not fully known to all agents. Let Ct :={Z1:t}∈
Ct denote the agents’ common information about Ht and P it := {Y i1:t, Ai1:t−1}\Ct ∈ P it denote
agent i’s private information about Ht, where P it and Ct denote the set of all possible realizations
of agent i’s private and common information at time t, respectively. In Section II-A, we discuss
several instances of information structures that can be captured as special cases of our model.
3) Strategies and Utilities: Let H it := {Ct, P it } ∈ Hit denote the information available to agent
i at t, where Hit denote the set of all possible realizations of agent i’s information at t. Agent i’s
behavioral strategy git, t ∈ T , is defined as a sequence of mappings git : Hit → ∆(Ait), t ∈ T ,
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8that determine agent i’s action Ait for every realization h
i
t ∈ Hit of the history at t ∈ T .
Agent i’s instantaneous utility at t depends on the system state Xt and the collective action
profile At, and is given by uit(Xt,At). Agent i chooses his strategy g
i
1:T so as to maximize his
total (expected) utility over horizon T , given by,
U i(X1:T , A1:T ) =
∑
t∈T
uit(Xt, At). (4)
To avoid measure-theoretic technical difficulties and for clarity and convenience of exposition,
we assume that all the random variables take values in finite sets.
Assumption 1. (Finite game) The sets Xt, Zt, Y it , Ait, N , and T are finite.
Moreover, we assume that given any sequence of actions a1:t−1 up to time t−1, every possible
realization xt∈Xt of the system state at t has a strictly positive probability of realization.
Assumption 2. (Strictly positive transition matrix) For all t∈T , xt∈Xt and a1:t−1∈A1:t−1, we
have P{xt|a1:t−1}>0.
Furthermore, we assume that for any sequence of actions {a1:T}, all possible realizations of
private observations {y1:N1:T } have positive probability. That is, no agent can infer perfectly another
agent’s action based only on his private observations.
Assumption 3. (Imperfect private monitoring) For all t∈T , y1:t∈Y1:t, and a1:t−1∈A1:t−1, we
have P{y1:t|a1:t−1}>0.
Remark 2. We can relax Assumptions 2 and 3 under certain conditions and obtain results
similar to those appearing in this paper; for instance, when agents actions are observable we
can relax Assumptions 2 and 3. Broadly, the crucial assumption that underlies our results is
that every deviation that can be detected by agent i at any time t must be also detectable by all
agents at the same time t based only on the common information Ct. Due to space limitation
we do not include the discussion of Assumptions 2 and 3 and the extension of our results when
we relax them; we refer an interested reader to [24].
A. Special Cases
We discuss several instances of dynamic games with asymmetric information that are special
cases of the general model described above.
November 23, 2018 DRAFT
91) Nested information structure: Consider a two-player game with one informed player and one
uninformed player and a general Markovian dynamics. At every time t∈T , the informed player
makes a private perfect observation of the state Xt, i.e. Y 1t =Xt. The uninformed player does
not have any observation of the state Xt. Both the informed and uninformed players observe
each others’ actions, i.e. Zt = {At−1}. Therefore, we have P 1t = {X1:t}, P 2t = ∅, and Ct =
{A11:t−1,A21:t−1} for all t∈ T . The above nested information structure corresponds to dynamic
games considered in [11], [25], [26], where in [25], [26] the state Xt is static.
2) Independent dynamics with observable actions: Consider an N -player game where the
state Xt := (X0t ,X
1
t ,X
2
t , ...,X
N
t ) has N components. The agents’ actions At are observable
by all agents, i.e. At−1 ⊂ Zt for all t ∈ T . At every time t ∈ T , agent i makes a perfect
observation of its local state X it as well as a global state X
0
t . Moreover, at time t all agents
make a common imperfect observation of state X it given by Z
i
t = O
c
t (X
i
t,At−1,W
c,i
t ), i ∈ N .
Conditioned on the agents’ collective action At, each X it evolves independently over time as
X it+1 =ft(X
i
t,At−1,W
x,i
t ) for all i∈N and t∈T . We assume that X1, W ct , t∈T , and W x,it , i∈N ,
t∈ T are mutually independent. Therefore, we have P it = {X i1:t} and Ct = {X01:t,Z1:N1:t ,A1:t−1}.
The above environment includes the dynamic game considered in [17], [18] as special cases.
3) Perfectly controlled dynamics with hidden actions: Consider a N -player game where the
state Xt := (X1t ,X
2
t , ...,X
N
t ) has N components. Agent i, i ∈ N , perfectly controls X it , i.e.
X it+1 = A
i
t. Agent i’s actions A
i
t, t∈T , is not observable by all other agents −i. Every agent
i, i∈N , makes a noisy private observation Y ti (Xt,W it ) of the system state at t∈T . Therefore,
we have P it :={A1:t, Y i1:t}, Ct=∅.
III. APPRAISALS AND ASSESSMENTS
In this section we provide an overview of the notions of appraisals, assessments, and an
equilibrium solution concept for dynamic games with asymmetric information. We argue that
an equilibrium solution concept must consist of a pair of a strategy profile and a belief system
(to be defined below), and discuss the importance of off-equilibrium path beliefs in dynamic
games.2
In a dynamic game with asymmetric information agents have private information about the
evolution of the game, and they do not observe the complete history of the game given by
2We refer the interested reader to the papers by Battigalli [27], Myerson and Remy [28], and Watson [29] for more discussion.
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{Ht,Xt}. Therefore, at every time t ∈ T , each agent, say agent i ∈ N, needs to form (i) an
appraisal about the current state of the system Xt and the other agents’ information H−it (appraisal
about the history), and (ii) an appraisal about how other agents will play in the future, so as
to evaluate the performance of his strategy choices (appraisal about the future). Given the other
agents’ strategies g−i, agent i can utilize his own information H it at t∈T , along with (i) other
agents’ past strategies g−i1:t−1 and (ii) other agents’ future strategies g
−i
t:T to form these appraisals
about the history and future of the game, respectively.
In contrast to dynamic teams where agents have a common objective and coordinate their
strategies, in dynamic games each agent has his own objective and chooses his strategy gi so
as to maximize his objective. Thus, unlike dynamic teams, in dynamic games strategy gi is
agent i’s private information and not known to other agents. Therefore, in dynamic games, each
agent needs to form a prediction about the other agents’ strategies. We denote this prediction by
g∗1:N1:T to distinguish it from the strategy profile g
1:N
1:T that is actually being played by the agents.
Following Nash’s idea, we assume that agents share a common prediction g∗ about the actual
strategy g. We would like to emphasize that the prediction g∗ does not necessarily coincide
with the actual strategy g. As we point out later, one requirement of an equilibrium is that for
every agent i∈N , the prediction g∗i must be an optimal strategy for him given the other agents
prediction strategies g∗−i.
Since an agent’s actual strategy, say agent i’s strategy gi, is his own private information, it
is possible that gi is different from the prediction g∗i. Below we discuss the implication of
an agent’s deviation from the prediction strategy profile g∗. For that matter, we first consider
an agent who may want to deviate from g∗, and then we consider an agent who faces such a
deviation and his response.
In dynamic games, when agent i∈N chooses his strategy gi, he needs to know how other
agents will play for any choice of gi which can be different from the prediction g∗i. Therefore,
the prediction g∗ has to be defined at all possible information realizations (i.e. information sets)
of every agent, those that have positive probability under g∗ as well as those that have zero
probability under g∗.3 Using the prediction g∗, any agent, say agent i, can form an appraisal
about the future of the game for any strategy choice gi, and evaluate the performance of gi.
3This is not an issue in dynamic teams since agents coordinate in advance their choice of strategy profile g, and no agent has
an incentive to (privately) deviate from it. Hence, the agents’ strategy profile g is needed to be defined only on information sets
of positive probability under g.
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By the same rationale, when agent i chooses gi he needs to determine his strategy for all
of his information sets, even those that have zero probability under g∗−i. This is because it is
possible that some agent j∈N may deviate from g∗j and play a strategy gj that is different from
the prediction g∗j . Agent i must foresee these possible deviations by other agents and determine
his response to these deviations.
To determine his optimal strategy gi at any information set, agent i needs to first form an
appraisal about the history of the game at t as well as an appraisal about the future of the game
using the strategy prediction g∗−i. For an information set hit that is compatible with the prediction
g∗−i given his strategy gi at t∈T (i.e. hit has positive probability of being realized under g∗),
agent i can use Bayes’ rule to derive the appraisal about the history of the game at t. However, for
an information set hit that has zero probability under the prediction g
∗−i given gi, agent i cannot
anymore rely on the prediction g∗ and use Bayes’ rule to form his appraisal about the history
of the game at t. The realization of history hit tells agent i that his original prediction g
∗−i
1:t−1 is
not (completely) correct, thus, he needs to revise his original prediction g∗−i1:t−1 and to form a
revised appraisal about the history of the game at t. Therefore, agent i must determine how to
form/revise his appraisal about the history of the game for every realization hit∈Hit, t∈T , that
has zero probability under g∗−i. We note that upon reaching an information set of measure zero,
agent i only revises his prediction g∗−i1:t−1 about other agents’ past strategies, but does not change
his prediction g∗−it:T about their future strategies. This is because at equilibrium, the prediction
g∗−it:T specifies a set of strategies for other agents that are optimal in the continuation game that
takes place after the realization of the information set hit of zero probability under g
∗
1:t−1.
4
We describe below how one can formalize the above issues we need to consider in the study of
dynamic games with asymmetric information. Following the game theory literature [30], agents’
appraisals about the history and future of the game can be captured by an assessment that all
agents commonly hold about the game. We define an assessment as a pair of mappings (g∗,µ),
where g∗:={g∗it ,i∈N, t∈T }, g∗it :Hit→∆(Ait) denotes a prediction about agent i’s strategy at
t, and µ := {µit,i∈N,t∈ T }, where µit :Hit →∆(Xt×H−it ) denotes agent i’s belief about the
4In dynamic teams, agents only need to determine their optimal strategy g for information sets that have positive probability
under g. As a result, a collective choice of strategy g is optimal at every information set with positive probability if and only
if it maximizes the (expected) utility of the team from t = 1 up to T . However, in dynamic games agents need to determine
their strategies for all information sets irrespective of whether they have zero or positive probability under g∗. Therefore, if a
choice of strategy gi maximizes agent i’s (expected) utility from t = 1 to T = 1, it does not imply that it is also optimal at
all information sets that have zero probability under {g∗−i, gi}. Consequently, a choice of agent i’s strategy must be optimal
for all continuation games that follow after a realization of an information set hit irrespective of whether it has zero or positive
probability.
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system state Xt and agents −i’s information H−it given his information H it . The collection of
mappings µ := {µit,i∈N,t∈T } is called a belief system. For every i∈N , t∈T , and hit ∈Hit,
µit(h
i
t) denotes agent i’s belief about the history {Xt,H−it } of the game, and g∗−it:T denotes agent
i’s prediction about all other agents’ continuation strategy from t onward. We note that µit(h
i
t)
determines agent i’s appraisal about the history of the game when hit has either positive or
zero probability under g∗. Therefore, using an assessment (g∗,µ) each agent can fully construct
appraisals about the history and future of the game at any t∈T .
Using the definition of an assessment, we can extend the idea of Nash equilibrium to dynamic
games with asymmetric information. An equilibrium of the dynamic game is defined as a common
assessment (g∗, µ) among the agents that satisfies the following conditions under the assumption
that the agents are rational. (i) Agent i ∈ N chooses his strategy gi1:T so as to maximize his
total expected utility (4) in all continuation games given the assessment (g∗,µ) about the game.
Therefore, the prediction g∗i1:T that other agents hold about agent i’s strategy must be a maximizer
of agent i’s total expected utility under the assessment (g∗,µ). (ii) For all t∈T , agent i’s, i∈N ,
belief µit(h
i
t) at information set h
i
t ∈ Hit that has positive probability of realization under g∗,
must be equal to the probability distribution of {Xt,H−it } conditioned on the realization hit
(determined via Bayes’ rule) assuming that agents −i play according to g∗−i1:t . When hit has zero
probability under the assessment g∗, the belief µit(h
i
t) cannot be determined via Bayes’ rule and
must be revised. The revised belief must satisfy a certain set of “reasonable” conditions so as
to be compatible with agent i’s rationality. Various sets of conditions have been proposed in
the literature (see [30], [31]) to capture the notion of ”reasonable” beliefs that are compatible
with the agents’ rationality. Different sets of conditions for off-equilibrium beliefs µit(h
i
t) result
in the different equilibrium concepts that are proposed for dynamic games with asymmetric
information.
In this paper, we consider Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) as the equilibrium solution
concept. In the next section we provide the formal definition of PBE.
IV. PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM
The formal definition of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) for dynamic games in extensive
form can be found in [31]. In this paper we use a state space representation for dynamic games
instead of an extensive game form representation, therefore, we need to adapt the definition of
PBE to this representation. A PBE is defined as an assessment (g∗,µ) that satisfies the sequential
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rationality and consistency conditions. The sequential rationality condition requires that for all
i ∈ N , the prediction g∗i is optimal for agent i given the assessment (g∗,µ). The consistency
condition requires that for all i∈N , t∈T , and hit∈Hit, agent i’s belief µ(hit) must be compatible
with prediction g∗. We formally define these conditions below.
Let P(g
∗−i
t:T ,g
∗i
t:T )
µit
{·|hit} denote the probability measure induced by the stochastic process that starts
at time t with initial condition {Xt,P−it ,pit,ct}, where random variables {Xt,P−it } are distributed
according to probability distribution µit(h
i
t), assuming that agents i and −i take actions according
to strategies g∗it:T and g
∗−i
t:T , respectively. In the sequel, to save some notation, we write Pg
∗
µ{·}
instead of P(g
∗−i
t:T ,g
∗i
t:T )
µit
{·} whenever there is no confusion.
Definition 1 (Sequential rationality). We say that an assessment (g∗,µ) is sequentially rational
if ∀i∈N , t∈T , and hit∈Hit, the strategy prediction g∗it:T is a solution to
sup
git:T
E(g
∗−i
t:T ,g
i
t:T )
µit
{
T∑
τ=t
uit(Xt, At)|hit
}
(5)
The sequential rationality condition (5) requires that, given the assessment (g∗,µ), the pre-
diction strategy gi∗t for agent i is an optimal strategy for him for all continuation games after
history realization hit ∈ H i, irrespective of whether hit has positive or zero probability under
(g∗,µ). That is, the common prediction g∗i about agent i’s strategy must be an optimal strategy
choice for him since it is common knowledge that he is a rational agent. We note that the
sequential rationality condition defined above is more restrictive than the optimality condition
for Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) which only requires (5) to hold at t=1. By the sequential
rationality condition, we require the optimality of prediction g∗ even along off-equilibrium paths,
and thus, we rule out the possibility of non-credible threats (see [30] for more discussion).
The sequential rationality condition results in a set of constraints that the strategy prediction
g∗ must satisfy given a belief system µ. As we argued in Section III, the belief system µ must
be also compatible with the strategy prediction g∗. The following consistency condition captures
such compatibility between the belief system µ and the prediction g∗.
Definition 2 (Consistency). We say that an assessment (g∗,µ) is consistent if
i) for all i ∈ N, t ∈ T \{1}, hit−1 ∈ Hit−1, and hit ∈ Hit such that Pg∗µ {hit|hit−1}> 0, the belief
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µit(h
i
t) must satisfy Bayes’ rule, i.e.
µit(h
i
t)(x1:t, p
−i
t ) =
Pg∗{hit, xt, p−it |hit−1}
Pg∗{hit|hit−1}
. (6)
ii) for all i∈N , t∈T \{1}, hit−1∈Hit−1, and hit∈Hit such that Pg∗µ {hit|hit−1}=0, we have
µit(h
i
t)(x1:t, p
−i
t ) > 0
only if there exists an open loop strategy (A−i1:t−1 = aˆ
−i
1:t−1,A
i
1:t−1 =a
i
1:t−1) such that
P(A
−i
1:t−1=aˆ
−i
1:t−1,A
i
1:t−1=a
i
1:t−1){xt, p−it } > 0. (7)
The above consistency condition places a restriction on the belief system µ so that it is
compatible with the strategy prediction g∗. For information sets along equilibrium paths, i.e.
Pg
∗
µi1
{hit} > 0, belief µit(hit) must be updated according to (6) via Bayes’ rule since agent i’s
observations are consistent with the prediction g∗. For information sets along off-equilibrium
paths, i.e. Pg
∗
µi1
{hit} = 0, agent i needs to revise his belief about the strategy of agents −i as
the realization of hit indicates that some agent has deviated from prediction g
∗−i
1:t . As pointed
out before, the revised belief µi(hit) must be “reasonable”. Definition 2 provides a set of such
“reasonable” conditions captured by (6) and (7) that we discuss further below.
First, consider an information set hit along an off-equilibrium path such that P
g∗
µit−1
{hit|hit−1}>0.
That is, conditioned on reaching information set hit−1 at t−1, hit has a positive probability under
the prediction strategy g∗. Since Pg
∗
µi1
{hit}=Pg
∗
µit−1
{hit|hit−1}Pg
∗
µi1
{hit−1} and Pg
∗
µi1
{hit}= 0, we have
Pg
∗
µi1
{hit−1} = 0. Therefore, hit−1 is also an information set along an off-equilibrium path, and
µi(hit−1) is a revised belief that agent i holds at t−1. Note that if the assessment (g∗,µ) satisfies
the sequential rationality condition, g∗ is a best response for all agents in all continuation games
that follow the realization of every information set of positive or zero probability. Moreover,
since Pg
∗
t−1
µit−1
{hit|hit−1}> 0, the realization of hit conditioned on reaching hit−1 is consistent with
the strategy prediction g∗t−1. Therefore, agent i does not have any reason to further revise his
belief about agents −i’s strategy beyond the revision that results in µit−1(hit−1). Thus, agent i
determines his belief µit(h
i
t) by utilizing his belief µ
i
t−1(h
i
t−1) at t−1 and updating it via Bayes’
rule assuming that agents −i’ play according to g∗−it−1 (see part (i), eq. (6)).
Next, consider an information set hit along an off-equilibrium path such that P
g∗
µit
{hit|hit−1}=0.
That is, conditioned on reaching information set hit−1 at t− 1, hit has a zero probability of
November 23, 2018 DRAFT
15
realization under the prediction g∗. In this case, the realization of hit indicates that agents −i
have deviated from prediction g∗−i1:t−1, and this deviation has not been detected by agent i before.
Therefore, agent i needs to form a new belief about agents −i’s private information P−it and the
state Xt by revising µit(h
i
t). Part (ii) of the consistency condition concerns such belief revisions
and requires that the support of agent i’s revised belief µit(h
i
t) includes only the states and private
information that are feasible under the system and information dynamics (1) and (2), that is,
they are reachable under some open-loop control strategy (A−i1:t−1 = aˆ
−i
1:t−1,A
i
1:t−1 =a
i
1:t−1). We
note that since we are using a state representation of the dynamic game, we need to impose
such a requirement, whereas in the equivalent extensive form representation of the game such a
requirement is satisfied by the construction of the game-tree.
Remark 3. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, we have P(A1:t−1=aˆ1:t−1)µ1 {x1:t,p−it }> 0 for all (A1:t−1 =
aˆ1:t−1). Therefore part (ii) of the consistency conditions is trivially satisfied. In the rest of the
paper, we ignore part (ii) and only consider part (i) of the definition of consistency. In [24], we
discuss the case when we relax Assumptions 2 and 3.
We can now provide the formal definition of PBE for the dynamic game of Section II.
Definition 3. An assessment (g∗,µ) is called a PBE if it satisfies the sequential rationality and
consistency conditions.
The definition of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium provides a general formalization of outcomes
that are rationalizable (i.e. consistent with agents’ rationality) under some strategy profile and
belief system. However, as we argue further in Section VII, there are computational and philo-
sophical reasons that motivate us to define a sub class of PBEs that provide a simpler and
more tractable approach to characterizing the outcomes of dynamic games with asymmetric
information.
There are two major challenges in computing a PBE (g∗,µ). First, there is an inter-temporal
coupling between the agents’ strategy prediction g∗ and belief system µ. According to the
consistency requirement, the belief system µ has to satisfy a set of conditions given a strategy
prediction g∗. On the other hand, by sequential rationality, a strategy prediction g∗ must satisfy
a set of optimality condition given belief system µ. Therefore, there is a circular dependency
between a prediction strategy g∗ and a belief system µ over time. For instance, by sequential
rationality, agent i’s strategy gi∗t at time t depends on the agents’ future strategies g
∗
t:T and on
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the agents’ past strategies g∗1:t−1 indirectly through the consistency condition for µ
i
t. As a result,
one needs to determine the strategy prediction g∗ and belief system µ simultaneously for the
whole time horizon so as to satisfy the sequential rationality and consistency conditions, and
thus, cannot sequentially decompose the computation of PBE over time. Second, the agents’
information hit, i ∈ N , has a growing domain over time. Hence, the agents’ strategies have
growing domains over time, and this feature further complicates the computation of PBEs of
dynamic games with asymmetric information.
The definition of PBE requires an agent to keep track of all observations he acquires over
time and to form beliefs about the private information of all other agents. As we show next,
agents do not need to keep track of all of their past observations to reach an equilibrium. They
can take into account fewer variables for decision making and ignore part of their information
that is not relevant to the continuation game. As we argue in Section VII, the class of simpler
strategies proposed in this paper characterize a more plausible prediction about the outcome of
the interaction among agents when the underlying system is highly dynamic and there exists
considerable information asymmetry among them.
V. THE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION APPROACH
We characterize a class of PBEs that utilize strategy choices that are simpler than general
behavioral strategies as they require agents to keep track of only a compressed version of their
information over time. We proceed as follows. In Section V-A we provide sufficient conditions for
the subset of private information an agent needs to keep track of over time for decision making
purposes. In Section V-D, we introduce the sufficient information based belief as a compressed
version of the agents’ common information that is sufficient for decision-making purposes. Based
on these compressions of the agents’ private and common information, we introduce the notion
of sufficient information based assessments and Sufficient Information Based-Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (SIB-PBE) in Sections V-D and V-E, respectively.
A. Sufficient Private Information
The key ideas for compressing an agent’s private information appear in Definitions 4 below;
We refer an interested reader to the companion paper [2] for discussion on the rationale behind
Definition 4.
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Definition 4 (Sufficient private information). We say Sit = ζ it(P it , Ct; g∗1:t−1), i ∈ N , t ∈ T , is
sufficient private information for the agents if,
(i) it can be updated recursively as
Sit = φ
i
t(S
i
t−1, H
i
t\H it−1; g∗1:t−1) if t ∈ T \{1}, (8)
(ii) for any strategy profile g∗ and for all realizations {ct, pt, pt+1, zt+1, at} ∈ Ct×Pt×Pt+1×
Zt+1 of positive probability,
Pg∗1:t
{
st+1,zt+1
∣∣∣pt,ct,at}=Pg∗1:t{st+1,zt+1∣∣∣st,ct,at} , (9)
where s1:Nτ =ζ
1:N
τ (p
1:N
τ ,cτ ;g
∗
1:τ−1) for τ ∈ T ;
(iii) for every strategy profile g˜∗ of the form g˜∗ := {g˜∗it : S it × Ct → ∆(Ait), i ∈N,t ∈ T } and
at∈At, t∈T ;
Eg˜∗1:t−1
{
uit(Xt,At)
∣∣∣ct,pit,at}=Eg˜∗1:t−1{uit(Xt,At)∣∣∣ct,sit,at}, (10)
for all realizations {ct,pit}∈Ct×P it of positive probability where s1:Nτ =ζ1:Nτ (p1:Nτ ,cτ ; g˜∗1:τ−1)
for τ ∈ T ;
(iv) given an arbitrary strategy profile g˜∗ of the form g˜∗ := {g˜it : S it×Ct → ∆(Ait), i∈N , t∈T },
i∈N , and t∈T ,
Pg˜∗1:t−1
{
s−it
∣∣∣pit,ct}=Pg˜∗1:t−1{s−it ∣∣∣sit,ct} , (11)
for all realizations {ct,pit}∈Ct×P it of positive probability where s1:Nτ =ζ1:Nτ (p1:Nτ ,cτ ; g˜∗1:τ−1)
for τ ∈ T .
We note that the conditions of Definition 4 is written in terms of strategy prediction profile g∗
for dynamic games. This is because, as we discussed before, the agents’ actual strategy profile
g is their private information. Therefore, each agent i, i ∈ N , evaluates the sufficiency of a
compression of his private information using the strategy prediction he holds about other agents.
B. Sufficient Common Information
Based on the characterization of sufficient private information, we present a statistic (com-
pressed version) of the common information Ct that agents need to keep track of over time for
decision making purposes.
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Consider the sufficient private information S1:Nt , t∈T . Define S it to be the set of all possible
realizations of Sit , and St :=
∏N
i=1S it . Let γt :Ct→∆(Xt×St) denote a mapping that determines
a conditional probability distribution over the system state Xt and the agents’ sufficient private
information St given the common information Ct at time t. We call the collection of mappings
γ := {γt,t ∈ T } a Sufficient Information Based belief system (SIB belief system). Note that
γt is only a function of the common information Ct, and thus, it is computable by all agents.
Let Πγt :=γt(Ct) denote the (random) sufficient information based belief that agents hold under
belief system γ at t. We can interpret Πγt as the common belief that each agent holds about the
system state Xt and all the agents’ (including himself) sufficient private information St at time
t. We call the SIB belief Πt a sufficient common information for the agents. In the rest of the
paper, we write Πt and drop the superscript γ whenever such a simplification in notation is clear.
Moreover, we use the terms sufficient common information and SIB belief interchangeably.
C. Special Cases:
We consider the special classes described in Section II and identify the sufficient information
S1:N1:T and SIB belief for each of them.
1) Nested information structure: The uninformed agent (agent 2) has no private information,
P 2t = ∅. Thus, S2t = ∅. For the informed agent (agent 1) consider P 1,prt =Xt. Consequently, we
can set S1t =Xt. Note that P
2
t =∅, thus, the uninformed agent’s belief about P 1t is the same as
SIB belief Πt=P{Xt|A11:t−1,A21:t−1}.
2) Independent dynamics with observable actions: Consider Sit = X
i
t . Note that X
j
t , j ∈ N
have independent dynamics given the collective action At that is commonly observable by all
agents. Therefore, agent i’s belief about Xj , j 6= i, is the same as SIB belief, Πt=Pg{Xjt |Ct}=
Pg{Xjt |P it , Ct}.
3) Perfectly controlled dynamics with hidden actions: Since agent i, i ∈ N , perfectly controls
X it over time t∈T , we set Sit ={Ait−1, Y it } and Πt=∅.
D. Sufficient Information based Assessment
As we discussed in Section IV, to form a prediction about the game we need to determine
an assessment about the game that is sequentially rational and consistent. We show below that
using the sufficient private information S1:Nt and sufficient common information (the SIB belief)
Πt, we can form a sufficient information based assessment about the game. We prove that such
a sufficient information based assessment is rich enough to capture a subset of PBE.
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Consider a class of strategies that utilize the information given by (Πt,Sit) for agent i∈N at
time t. We call the mapping σit :∆(Xt×St)×S it →∆(Ait) a Sufficient Information Based (SIB)
strategy for agent i at time t. A SIB strategy σit determines a probability distribution for agent i’s
action Ait at time t given his information (Πt,S
i
t). A SIB strategy is a behavioral strategy where
agents only use the SIB belief Πt = γt(Ct) (instead of complete common information Ct), and
the sufficient private information Sit = ζ
i
t(P
i
t ,Ct; g
∗
1:t−1) (instead of complete private information
P it ). A collection of SIB strategies {σ11:T, ...,σN1:T} is called a SIB strategy profile σ. The set of
SIB strategies is a subset of behavioral strategies, defined in Section II, as we can define,
g
(σ,γ),i
t (h
i
t) := σ
i
t(pi
γ
t , s
i
t).
In Section IV, we defined a consistency condition between strategy prediction g∗ and a
belief system µ. Below, we provide an analogous consistency condition between a SIB strategy
prediction σ∗ and a SIB belief system γ.
Definition 5. A pair (σ∗,γ) of a SIB strategy prediction profile σ∗ and belief system γ satisfies
the consistency condition if
(i) for all t∈T \{1}5, zt∈Zt, pit−1 =γt−1(ct−1), and pit=γt({ct−1,zt}) such that Pσ
∗
t
pit−1{zt}>0,
pit must satisfy Bayes’ rule, i.e.,
pit(xt, st) =
Pσ
∗
t
pit−1{xt, st, zt}
Pσ
∗
t
pit−1{zt}
, ∀xt ∈ Xt,∀st ∈ St, (12)
(ii) for all t ∈ T \{1}, ct−1 ∈ Ct−1, pit−1 = γt−1(ct−1), zt ∈ Zt, and pit = γt({ct−1,zt}) such that
Pσ
∗
t
pit−1{zt}=0, we have
pit(xt, st) > 0, ∀xt ∈ Xt,∀st ∈ St,
only if there exists an open-loop strategy (A1:t−1 = a1:t−1) such that P(A1:t−1=a1:t−1)pi1 {ct−1,zt}>
0, and
P(A1:t−1=a1:t−1)pi1 {xt, st} > 0, (13)
(iii) for all t ∈ T \{1}, ct−1 ∈ Ct−1, pit−1 = γt−1(ct−1), zt ∈ Zt, and pit = γt({ct−1,zt}) such that
5For t=1, Π1 is given by the conditional probability at t=1 as Π1(x1,s1):= P{s1|x1,z1}∑
xˆ1∈X1 P{z1|xˆ1}η(xˆ1)
.
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Pσ
∗
t
pit−1{zt}=0, we have ∑
xt∈Xt
pit(xt, st) > 0, ∀st ∈ St
if there exists an open-loop strategy (A1:t−1 = a1:t−1) such that P(A1:t−1=a1:t−1)pi1 {ct−1,zt}> 0,
and ∑
xt∈Xt
P(A1:t−1=a1:t−1)pi1 {xt, st} > 0. (14)
Parts (i) and (ii) of Definition 5 follow from rationales similar to their analogues in Definition
2, and require a SIB belief system to satisfy a sets of constraints with respect to a SIB strategy
profile that are similar to those for an assessment (g∗,µ). Definition 5 requires an additional
condition described by part (iii). By (14), we require a SIB belief system γ consistent with the
SIB strategy profile σ∗ to assign a positive probability to every realization st of the agents’
sufficient private information St that is “plausible” given the common information realization
ct = {ct−1,zt}; plausibility of st given ct means that there exists an open-loop strategy profile
(A1:t−1 =a1:t−1) consistent with the realization ct that leads to the realization of st with positive
probability. Therefore, part (iii) ensures that there exists no possible incompatibility between the
SIB belief Πt and the agents’ sufficient private information St+1. As we show later (Section
V-E), such a compatibility condition allows each agent to refine the SIB belief Πt using his own
private sufficient information Sit , and to form his private belief about the game.
Remark 4. Assumptions 2 and 3 imply that (13) holds for all (A1:t−1 = a1:t−1) such that
P(A1:t−1=a1:t−1) {ct}>0. Therefore, in the rest of the paper, we ignore part (ii) of the consistency
condition for SIB belief systems. Moreover, under Assumptions 2 and 3, condition (14) is
always satisfied. Therefore, condition (iii) is equivalent to having
∑
xt∈Xtpit(xt,pt)>0 whenever
Pσ∗pit−1{zt}=0.
Given a SIB strategy profile prediction σ∗, a consistent SIB belief must satisfy (12), which
determines the SIB belief Πt at t in terms of the SIB belief Πt−1 at t− 1 and the new common
information Zt at t. We define a SIB belief update rule as a mapping ψt : ∆(Xt−1×St−1)×Zt→
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∆(Xt×St), t∈T that determines recursively the SIB belief
Πψt := ψt(Π
ψ
t−1, Zt), (15)
as a function of new common observation Zt at t and the SIB belief Π
ψ
t−1 at t−1.6 The superscript
ψ in Πψt indicates that the SIB belief Π
ψ
t is generated using the SIB update rule ψ. Let γψ denote
the common belief system that is equivalent to the SIB update rule ψ. We call a SIB belief update
rule ψ consistent with a SIB strategy profile σ∗ if the equivalent SIB belief system γψ is consistent
with σ∗ (Definition 5).
Define a SIB assessment (σ∗,γ) as a pair of SIB strategy profile σ∗ and a SIB belief system γ.
Below, we show that a consistent SIB assessment (σ∗,γ) is equivalent to a consistent assessment
(g∗,µ) as defined in Section IV (Definition 2).
Lemma 1. For any given SIB assessment (σ∗,γ), there exists an equivalent assessment (g∗,µ)
of a behavioral strategy prediction g∗ and belief system µ such that:
i) the behavioral strategy g∗ is defined by
g∗it (h
i
t) := σ
∗i
t (pi
γ
t , s
i
t); (16)
ii) the belief system µ is consistent with g∗ and satisfies
Pg∗
{
s−it |hit
}
= P
{
s−it |pit, sit
}
, (17)
for all i∈N , t∈ T ,hit ∈Hit, and s−it ∈ S−it .
Lemma 1 shows that the set of consistent SIB assessment (σ∗,γ) is equivalent to a subset of
consistent assessments (g∗,µ). That is, using the SIB belief system γ and SIB strategy profile σ∗,
agents can form a consistent assessment about the evolution of the game. Moreover, condition
(17) implies that the SIB belief Πt along with agent i’s sufficient information Sit capture all the
information in H it that is relevant to agent i’s belief about S
−i
t .
6Upon reaching an information set of measure zero (parts (ii) and (iii) of Definition 5), the revised SIB belief could be
a function of Ct = {Ct−1,Zt}, rather than only Πt−1(Ct−1) and Zt. Therefore, the set of SIB belief systems that can be
generated from SIB update rules is a subset of all consistent SIB belief systems given by Definition 5. However, we argue that
upon reaching an information set of measure zero, it is more plausible to revise the SIB belief only as a function of relevant
information Πt−1(Ct−1) and Zt; Ct is irrelevant given Πt−1(Ct−1) and Zt.
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E. Sufficient Information based PBE
Using the result of Lemma 1, we can define a class of PBE, called Sufficient Information
based PBE (SIB-PBE), as a set of equilibria for dynamic games with asymmetric information
that can be expressed as SIB assessments.
Definition 6. A SIB assessment (σ∗,γ) is called a SIB-PBE if γ is consistent with σ∗ (Definition
5), and the equivalent consistent assessment (g∗, µ), given by Lemma 1, is a PBE.
In the sequel, we also call a consistent pair (σ∗,ψ) of a SIB strategy prediction profile σ∗ and
SIB belief update rule ψ a SIB-PBE if (σ∗,γψ) is a SIB-PBE.
Throughout Section V, we assumed that agents play according to the strategy predictions g∗
(or SIB strategy predictions σ∗). However, an agent’s, say agent i ∈N ’s, actual strategy gi is
his private information and could be different from g∗ if such a deviation is profitable for him.
The proposed class of SIB assessments imposes two restrictions on agents’ strategies and beliefs
compared to the general class of assessment presented in Section IV. First, it requires that each
agent i, i∈N , must play a SIB strategy σ∗i instead of a general behavioral strategy g∗i. Second,
it requires that each agent i, i∈N , must form a belief about the status of the game using only
the SIB belief Πt along with his sufficient private information Sit (instead of a general belief
µit). A strategic agent i∈N does not restrict his choice of strategy to SIB strategies, and may
deviate from σ∗i to a non-SIB strategy gi if it is profitable to him. Moreover, a strategic agent
i does not limit himself to form belief about the current status of the game only based on Πt
and Sit , and may instead use a general belief µ
i if it enables him to improve his expected utility.
In the next section, we address these strategic concerns, and show that no agent i∈N wants to
deviate from (Π,σ∗) and play a non-SIB strategy gi when all other agents are playing according
to SIB assessment (Π,σ∗). This result allows us to focus on the class of SIB assessments, and
develop a methodology to sequentially decompose the dynamic game over time.
VI. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we show that the class of SIB assessments is rich enough to capture the agents’
strategic interactions.We first show that when agents −i play according to a SIB assessment
(σ∗,γ), agent i, i∈N , cannot mislead these agents by playing a strategy gi different from σ∗i,
thus, creating dual beliefs, one belief that is based on the SIB assessment (σ∗,γ) the functional
form of which is known to all agents, and another belief that is based on his private strategy
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gi that is only known to him (Theorem 1). Then, we show that given that agents −i play SIB
strategy σ∗−i, agent i has a response that is a SIB strategy (Theorem 2).
The result of Theorems 1 (resp. 2) for agent i ∈ N assumes that all other agents −i are playing
according to strategy prediction g∗−i (resp. σ∗−1). The same results hold for every continuation
game that starts at any time t ∈ T along an off-equilibrium path; they can be proved by relabeling
time t as time 1, and using the SIB belief pit = γt(ct) and the corresponding belief µit(h
i
t), defined
by Lemma 1, as the initial common belief for the continuation game.
Using the results of Theorems 1 and 2, we present a methodology to determine the set
of SIB-PBEs of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information (Theorem 3). The
proposed methodology leads to a sequential decomposition of stochastic dynamic games with
asymmetric information. This decomposition gives rise to a dynamic program that can be utilized
to compute SIB-PBEs via backward induction. We proceed by stating the following results from
the companion paper [2, Theorem 1].
Theorem 1 (Policy-independence belief property [2]).
(i) Consider a general strategy prediction profile g∗. If agents −i play according to strategy
predictions g∗−i, then for every strategy gi that agent i plays,
Pg∗,g−i
{
xt, p
−i
t
∣∣∣hit} = Pg∗−i {xt, p−it ∣∣∣hit} . (18)
(ii) Consider a SIB strategy prediction profile σ∗ along with the associated consistent update
rule ψ. If agents −i play according to SIB strategy predictions σ∗−i, then for every general
strategy gi that agent i plays,
Pσ
∗−i,gi
ψ
{
xt, p
−i
t
∣∣∣hit}=Pσ∗−iψ {xt, p−it ∣∣∣hit}. (19)
Part (i) of Theorem 1 states that under perfect recall agent i’s belief is independent of his
actual strategy gi. Therefore, agent i cannot mislead agents −i by deviating from the SIB strategy
prediction g∗i to a behavioral strategy gi so as to create dual beliefs (described above) that he
can use to his advantage. Part (ii) of Theorem 1 concerns situations where all agents except
agent i play SIB strategies σ∗−i. Given SIB update rule ψ that is consistent with σ∗, it states
that agent i’s beliefs independent of his actual strategy gi. We note when agents −i play SIB
strategies the consistency condition for SIB update rule ψ depends on strategy prediction σ∗i
they have about agent i.
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Using the result of Theorem 1, we show that agent i∈N does not gain by playing a non-SIB
strategy g˜i when all other agents −i are playing SIB strategies σ∗−i.
Theorem 2 (Closedness of SIB strategies). Consider a consistent SIB assessment (σ∗,γψ) where
ψ is a SIB update rule consistent with σ∗. If every agent j∈N , j 6= i plays the SIB strategy σ∗j ,
then, there exists a SIB strategy σi for agent i that is a best response to σ∗−i.
The results of Theorems 1 and 2 address the two restrictions (discussed above) imposed in
SIB assessments on the agents’ beliefs and strategies, respectively.
Based on these results, we restrict attention to SIB assessments, and provide a sequential
decomposition of dynamic games with asymmetric information. A SIB-PBE is SIB assessment
that is a fixed point under the best response map for all agents. Below, we formulate a dynamic
program that enables us to compute SIB-PBEs of dynamic games with asymmetric information.
Consider a dynamic program over time horizon T ∪{T + 1} with information state {Πt,St},
t ∈ T . Let Vt := {V it : ∆(Xt ×St)×St → R, i ∈ N} denote the value function that captures
the continuation payoffs for all agents, for all realizations of the SIB belief Πt and the agents’
private sufficient information St, t ∈ T . Set V iT+1 = 0 for all i ∈ N . For each stage t ∈ T of
the dynamic program consider the following static game.
Stage game Gt(pit,Vt+1,ψt+1): Given the value function Vt+1 and SIB update rule ψt+1, we
define the stage game Gt(pit,Vt+1,ψt) as a static game of asymmetric information among agents
for every realization pit. Each agent i∈N has private information Sit that is distributed according
to pit, which is common knowledge among the agents. Given a realization at of the agents’
collective action profile and a realization st of the agents’ sufficient private information, agent
i’s utility is given by
U¯ it(at,st,pit,Vt+1,ψt+1) := Epit
{
uit(Xt,at)+V
i
t+1 (ψt+1(pit,Zt+1),St+1)
∣∣∣pit,st,at} . (20)
BNE correspondence: We define the correspondence BNEt (Vt+1,ψt+1), t∈T , as the corre-
spondence mapping that characterizes the set of BNEs of the stage game Gt(pit,Vt+1,ψt+1) for
every realization of pit; this correspondence is given by
BNEt (Vt+1,ψt+1) :=
{
σ∗t :∀pit∈∆(Xt×St), σ(pit,·) is a BNE of Gt(pit,Vt+1,ψt+1)
}
. (21)
We say σ∗(pit,·) is a BNE of the stage game Gt(pit,Vt+1,ψt) if for all agents i∈N , and for all
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sit∈S it ,
σ∗i(pit,sit)∈ arg max
α∈∆(Ait)
Epit
{
U¯ it((α,σ
∗−i(pit,S−it )),St,pit,Vt+1,ψt+1)
∣∣∣pit,sit}. (22)
Below, we provide a sequential decomposition of dynamic games with asymmetric information
using the stage game and the BNE correspondence defined above.
Theorem 3 (Sequential decomposition). A pair (σ∗,ψ) of a SIB strategy profile σ∗ and a SIB
update rule ψ (equivalently, a SIB assessment (σ∗,γψ)) is a SIB-PBE if (σ∗, ψ) solves the
following dynamic program:
for t=T+1:
V iT+1(·) := 0 ∀ i ∈ N ; (23)
for t ∈ T :
σ∗t ∈ BNEt (Vt+1, ψt+1) , (24)
ψt+1 is consistent with σ∗, (25)
V it (pit,st) :=E
σ∗t
ψt+1
{
U¯ it((σ
∗(pit,St)),St,pit,Vt+1,ψt+1)
∣∣∣pit,sit}, ∀i∈N. (26)
VII. DISCUSSION
We showed that SIB assessments proposed in this chapter are rich enough to capture a set
of PBE. However, we would like to point out that the concept of SIB-PBE does not capture all
PBEs of a dynamic game in general. We elaborate on the relation between the of SIB-PBE and
PBE below. We argue that the set of SIB-PBEs are more plausible to arise as the information
asymmetry among the agents increases and the underlying system is dynamic.
We presented an approach to compress the agents’ private and common information by
providing conditions sufficient to characterize the information that is relevant for decision making
purposes. Such information compression means that the agents do not incorporate into their
decision making processes their observations that are irrelevant to the continuation game. As
we show in [2], this information compression is without loss of generality for dynamic team
problems. However, this is not the case in dynamic games. In general, the set of SIB-PBEs
of a dynamic game is a subset of all PBEs of that game. This is because in a dynamic game
agents can incorporate their past irrelevant observations into their future decisions so as to create
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rewards (resp. punishments) that incentivize the agents to play (resp. not play) specific actions
over time. By compressing the agents’ private and common information in SIB assessments, we
do not capture such punishment/reward schemes that are based on past irrelevant observations.
Below, we present an example where there exists a PBE that cannot be captured as a SIB-PBE.
Consider a two-agent repeated game with T = 2 and a payoff matrix given in Table I. At
each stage, agent 1 chooses from {U,D}, and agent 2 chooses from {L,M,R}. We assume
that agents’ actions are observable. Therefore, the agents have no private information, and the
sufficient private information and SIB belief are trivial. The stage game has two equilibria in
pure strategies given by (D,M) and (U,R). Using the results of Theorem 3, we can characterize
four SIB-PBEs of the repeated game that correspond to the different combinations of the two
equilibria of the stage game as follows: (DD,MM), (UU,RR), (DU,MR), and (UD,RM).
However, there exists an another PBE of the repeated game that cannot be captured as a SIB-
PBE. Consider the following equilibrium: Play (U,L) at t=1. If agent 2 plays L at t=1 then
play (U,R); otherwise, play (D,M) at t= 2. Note that agent 1’s decision at t= 2 depends on
agent 2’s action at t= 1, which is a payoff-irrelevant information since the two stages of the
game are independent. Nevertheless, agent 1 utilizes agent 2’s action at t=1, and punishes him
(agent 2) by playing D at t=2 if he deviates from playing L at t=1.
L M R
U (8,3) (0,2) (2,10)
D (0,1) (1,2) (0,0)
TABLE I: Payoff matrix
We would like to point out that there are instances of dynamic games with asymmetric
information, such as zero-sum dynamic games [32], where the equilibrium payoffs for the agents
are unique. In these games it is not possible to incorporate pay-off irrelevant information so as to
construct additional equilibria where the agents’ payoffs are different from the ones corresponding
to SIB-PBEs; this is clearly the case for zero-sum games since the agents do not cooperate on
creating punishment/reward schemes due to the zero-sum nature of the game. In Section VIII,
we utilize this fact and prove the existence of SIB-PBEs in zero-sum games. Furthermore, we
show that SIB-PBEs are equivalent to PBEs, in terms of the agents’ equilibrium payoffs, in these
games.
While it is true that in general, the set of PBEs of a dynamic game is larger than the set of
SIB-PBEs of that game, in the remainder of this section, we provide three reasons on why in
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a highly dynamic environment with information asymmetry among agents, SIB-PBEs are more
plausible to arise as an outcome of a game.
First, we argue that in the face of a highly dynamic environment, an agent with partial
observations of the environment should not behave fundamentally different whether he interacts
in a strategic or cooperative environment. From the single-agent decision making point of view
(i.e. control theory), SIB strategies are the natural choice of an agent for decision making purposes
(See Thm. 2 in the companion paper [2]).7
Second, we argue that in a highly dynamic environment with information asymmetry among
the agents, the formation of punishment/reward schemes that utilize the agents’ payoff-irrelevant
information requires prior complex agreements among the agents; these complex agreements are
sensitive to the parameters of the model and are not very plausible to arise in practice when
the decision making problem for each agent is itself a complex task. We note that the set of
PBEs that cannot be captured as SIB-PBEs are the ones that utilize payoff-irrelevant information
to create punishment/reward schemes in the continuation game as in the example above. How-
ever, such punishment/reward schemes require the agents to form a common agreement among
themselves on how to utilize such payoff-irrelevant information and how to implement such
punishment/reward schemes. The formation of such a common agreement among the agents
is more likely in games where the underlying system is not highly dynamic (as in repeated
games [7]) and there is no much information asymmetry among agents. However, in a highly
dynamic environment with information asymmetry among agents the formation of such common
agreement becomes less likely for the following reasons. First, in those environments each agent’s
individual decision making process is described by a complex POMDP; thus, strategic agents
are less likely to form a prior common agreement (that depend on the solution of the individual
POMDPs) in addition to solving their individual POMDPs. Second, as the information asymmetry
increases among agents, punishment/reward schemes that utilize payoff-irrelevant information
require a complex agreement among the agents that is sensitive and not robust to changes in
the assumptions on the information structure of the game. For instance, consider the example
described above, but assume that agents observe imperfectly each others’ actions at each stage
(Assumption 3). Let 1− ,  ∈ (0,1), denote the probability that agents observe each others’
7The SIB approach proposed in this paper for dynamic games along with the SIB approach to dynamic teams proposed in the
companion paper [2] provide a unified approach to the study of agents’ behavior in a dynamic environment with information
asymmetry among them.
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actions perfectly, and  denote the probability that their observation is different from the true
action of the other agent. Then, the described non-SIB strategy profile above remains as a PBE of
the game only if ≤ 1
5
. The author of [33] provides a general result on the robustness of above-
mentioned punishment/reward schemes in repeated games; he shows that the set of equilibria
that are robust to changes in information structure that affect only payoff-irrelevant signals does
not include the set of equilibria that utilize punishment/reward schemes described above.
Third, the proposed notion of SIB-PBE can be viewed as a generalization of Markov Perfect
Equilibrium [3] to dynamic games with asymmetric information. Therefore, a similar set of
rationales that support the notion of MPE also applies to the notion of SIB-PBE as follows. First,
the set of SIB assessments describe the simplest form of strategies capturing the agents’ behavior
that is consistent with the agents’ rationality. Second, the class of SIB assessments captures the
notion that “bygones are bygones”, which also underlies the requirement of subgame perfection
in equilibrium concepts for dynamic games. That is, the agents’ strategies in two continuation
games that only differ in the agents’ information about payoff-irrelevant events must be identical.
Third, the class of SIB assessments embodies the principle that “minor changes in the past should
have minor effects”. This implies that if there exists a small perturbation in the specifications of
the game or the agents’ past strategies that are irrelevant to the continuation game, the outcome
of the continuation game should not change drastically. The two-step example above presents
one such situation, where one equilibrium that is not SIB-PBE disappears suddenly as → 1
5
.
VIII. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIA
As we discussed in Section VII, there exist PBEs that cannot be described as SIB-PBEs in
general. Therefore, the standard results that guarantee the existence of a PBE for dynamic games
with asymmetric information [31, Proposition. 249.1] cannot be used to guarantee the existence
of a SIB-PBE in these games. In this Section, we discuss the existence of SIB-PBEs for dynamic
games with asymmetric information. We provide conditions that are sufficient to guarantee the
existence of SIB-PBEs (Lemmas 2 and 3). Using the result of Lemma 2, we prove the existence
of SIB-PBEs for zero-sum dynamic games with asymmetric information (Theorem 4). Using
the result of Lemma 3, we identify instances of non-zero-sum dynamic games with asymmetric
information where we can guarantee the existence of SIB-PBEs.
Lemma 2. The dynamic program given by (24)-(26) has at least one solution at stage t if the
value function Vt+1 is continuous in pit+1.
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We note that the condition of Lemma 2 is always satisfied for t=T by definition of VT+1; see
(20) and (23). However, for t<T , it is not straightforward, in general, to prove the continuity
of the value function Vt in pit. Given Vt+1 is continuous in pit+1, the result of [34, Theorem 2]
implies that the set of equilibrium payoffs for the state game at t is upper-hemicontinuous in
pit. Therefore, if the stage game Gt(pit,Vt+1,ψt+1) has a unique equilibrium payoff for every pit,
we can show that Vt is continuous in pit for t<T . Using this approach, we prove the existence
of SIB-PBEs for zero-sum games below.
Theorem 4. For every dynamic zero-sum game with asymmetric information there exists a SIB-
PBE that is a solution to the dynamic program given by (24)-(26).
For dynamic non-zero-sum games, it is harder to establish that Vt is continuous in pit for t<T
since the set of equilibrium payoffs is not a singleton in general. However, we conjecture that
for every dynamic game with asymmetric information described in Section II, at every stage of
the corresponding dynamic program, it is possible to select a BNE for every realization of pit
so that the resulting Vt is continuous in pit.
In addition to the results of Lemma 2 and Theorem 4, we provide another condition below
that guarantees the existence of SIB-PBEs in some instances of dynamic games with asymmetric
information.
Lemma 3. A dynamic game with asymmetric information described in Section II has at least
one SIB-PBE if there exits sufficient information S1:N1:t such that the SIB update rule ψ1:T is
independent of σ∗.
The independence of SIB update rule from σ∗ is a condition that is not satisfied for all dynamic
games with asymmetric information. Nevertheless, we present below special instances where this
condition is satisfied.
1) Nested information structure with one controller [11]: Consider the nested information
structure case described in Section II. Assume that the evolution of the system is controlled only
by the uniformed player and is given by Xt+1 = ft(Xt,A2t,Wt). For S
1
t =Xt and S
2
t = 0, it is
easy to check that Pσ∗{pit+1|pit,at}=P{pit+1|pit,at} for all t∈T .
2) Independent dynamics with observable actions and no private valuation [18]: Consider
the model with independent dynamics and observable actions described in Section II. Assume
that agent i’s, i∈N , instantaneous utility is given by uit(At,X−it ) (no private valuation); that is,
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agent i’s utility at t does not depend on X it . It is easy to verify that S
i
t = ∅ is sufficient private
information for agent i. Hence, the condition of Lemma 3 is trivially satisfied.
3) Delayed sharing information structure with d=1 [35], [36]: Consider a delayed sharing
information structure where agents’ actions and observations are revealed publicly with d time
step delay. When delay d= 1, we have P it = {Y it }. Let Sit =P it =Y it . Then, it is easy to verify
that the condition of Lemma 3 is satisfied.
4) Uncontrolled state process with hidden actions: Consider an N -player game with
uncontrolled dynamics given by Xt+1 = ft(Xt,Wt), t ∈ T . At every time t ∈ T , agent i,
i ∈ N , receives a noisy observation Y it = Oit(X it , Zit). The agents’ actions are hidden. Thus,
P it ={Y i1:t, Ai1:t−1} and Ct = ∅. Hence, the condition of Lemma 3 is trivially satisfied. We note
that in the case where a subset of the agents’ observations is revealed to all agents’ with some
delay, i.e. Ct⊆{Y1:t}, the condition of Lemma 3 is also satisfied.
IX. CONCLUSION
We proposed a general approach to study dynamic games with asymmetric information. We
presented a set of conditions sufficient to characterize an information state for each agent that
effectively compresses his common and private information in a mutually consistent manner.
Along with the results in the companion paper [2], we showed that the characterized information
state provides a sufficient statistic for decision making purposes in strategic and non-strategic
settings. We introduced the notion of Sufficient Information based Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
that characterizes a set of outcomes in a dynamic game. We provided a sequential decomposition
of the dynamic game over time, which leads to a dynamic program for the computation of the
set of SIB-PBEs of the dynamic game. We determined conditions that guarantee the existence of
SIB-PBEs. Using these conditions, we proved the existence of SIB-PBE for dynamic zero-sum
games and for special instances of dynamic non-zero-sum games.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. For any given consistent SIB assessment (σ∗,γ), let g∗ denote the behavioral
strategy profile constructed according to (16). In the following, we construct recursively a belief
system µ that is consistent with g∗ and satisfies (17).
For t= 1, we have P i1 =Y
i
1 and C1 =Z1. Define
µit(h
i
1)(x1, p
−i
1 ) :=
P{y1, z1|x1}η(x1)∑
xˆ1∈X1 P{yi1, z1|xˆ1}η(xˆ1)
. (27)
For t>1, if Pg
∗
µit−1
{hit|hit−1}>0 (i.e. no deviation from g∗t−1 at t−1), define µit recursively by
Bayes’ rule,
µit(h
i
t)(xt, p
−i
t ) :=
Pg
∗
µit−1
{hit, xt, p−it |hit−1}
Pg∗
µit−1
{hit|hit−1}
. (28)
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For t>1, if Pg
∗
µit−1
{hit|hit−1}=0 (i.e. there is a deviation from g∗t−1 at t−1), define µit as,
µit(h
i
t)(xt, p
−i
t ) :=
|Pt|
|St|
γt(ct)(xt, st)∑
sˆ−it ∈S−it γ(ct)(xt, sˆ
−i
t , s
i
t)
, (29)
where sjt = ζ
j
t (p
j
t , ct; g
∗
1:t−1) for all j ∈N .
At t= 1, (17) holds by construction from (27). For t > 1,
Pg∗{S−it |hit} = Pg
∗{S−it |pit, ct} = Pg
∗{S−it |sit, ct} =
Pg∗{S−it , sit|ct}
Pg∗{sit|ct}
=
pit(S
−i
t , s
i
t)∑
sˆ−it ∈S−it pit(sˆ
−i
t , s
i
t)
= P{S−it |sit, pit}
where the second equality follows from (11). Therefore, (17) holds for all t∈ T .
Lemma 4. [2, Lemma 2] Given a SIB strategy profile σ∗ and update rule ψ consistent with σ∗,
Pσ∗ψ {St+1,Πt+1|pt, ct, at}=Pσ
∗
ψ {St+1,Πt+1|st, pit, at}. (30)
for all st, pit, at.
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider a “super dynamic system” as the collection of the original dy-
namic system along with agents −i who play according to SIB assessment (σ∗, γψ). This
superdynamic system captures the system agent i “sees”. We establish the claim of Theorem 2
in two steps: (i) we show that from agent i’s viewpoint the super dynamic system is a POMDP,
and (ii) we show that {Πt, Sit} is an information state for agent i when he faces the super
dynamic system with the original utility ui1:T (·, ·). Therefore, without loss of optimality, agent
i can choose his optimal decision strategy (best response) from the class of strategies that are
functions of the information state {Πt, Sit}, i.e. the class of SIB strategies.
To establish step (i), consider X˜ :={Xt,Πt,St,Πt−1,St−1} as the system state at t for the super
dynamic system. Agent i’s observation at time t is given by Y˜ it := {Y it ,Zt}. To show that the
super dynamic system is a POMDP, we need to show that it satisfies the following properties:
(a) it has a controlled Markovian dynamics, that is,
Pσ∗ψ {x˜t+1|x˜1:t, ai1:t, y˜i1:t}= Pσ
∗−i
ψ {x˜t+1|x˜t, ait}, ∀t∈ T , (31)
(b) agent i’s observation Y˜ it is a function of system state X˜t along with the previous action A
i
t−1,
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that is,
Pσ∗ψ {y˜it|x˜1:t,ai1:t−1, y˜i1:t−1}= Pσ
∗−i{y˜it|x˜t,ait−1}, ∀t∈ T , (32)
(c) agent i’s instantaneous utility at t∈ T can be written as a function u˜t(x˜t,ait) of system state
X˜t along with his action Ait, that is,
Eσ∗ψ
{
uit(Xt,At)|x˜1:t,ai1:t, y˜i1:t
}
= u˜t(x˜t,a
i
t), ∀t∈ T . (33)
Property (a) is true because,
Pσ∗ψ {x˜t+1|x˜1:t, ai1:t, y˜i1:t} = Pσ
∗
ψ {xt+1,pit+1,st+1,pit,st|x1:t,pi1:t,s1:t,yi1:t,z1:t,ai1:t}
=∑
a−it ,zt+1,yt+1
Pσ∗ψ {xt+1,pit+1,st+1,a−it ,zt+1,yt+1|x1:t,pi1:t,s1:t,yi1:t,z1:t,ai1:t}
by system dynamics (1) and (2)
=∑
a−it ,zt+1,yt+1
[
Pσ∗ψ {pit+1,st+1|x1:t,pi1:t,s1:t,yi1:t,z1:t,ai1:t,a−it ,xt+1,zt+1,yt+1}
P{zt+1,yt+1|xt+1,at}P{xt+1|xt,at}σ∗−it (pit,s−it )(a−it )
]
DefineZˆ := {zt+1 : pit+1= ψt+1(pit, zt+1)} &
Yˆ(zt+1) := {yt+1 : sjt+1= φjt+1(sjt,{yjt+1, zt+1, ajt}),∀j}
=∑
a−it , zt+1 ∈ Zˆ,
yt+1 ∈ Yˆ(zt+1)
[
Pψ{pit+1,st+1|st,pit,yt+1,xt+1,zt+1,at}P{yt+1,zt+1|xt+1,at}P{xt+1|xt,at}σ∗−it (pit,s−it )(a−it )
]
=
Pσ∗−iψ {xt+1,pit+1,st+1|xt,pit,st,ait} = Pσ
∗−i
ψ {x˜t+1|x˜t,ait}.
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Property (b) is true because
Pσ∗ψ {y˜it|x˜1:t,ai1:t−1, y˜i1:t−1} = Pσ
∗
ψ {yit,zt|x1:t,pi1:t,s1:t,yi1:t−1,z1:t−1,ai1:t−1}
=∑
a−it−1
Pσ∗ψ {yit,zt,a−it−1|x1:t,pi1:t,s1:t,yi1:t−1,z1:t−1,ai1:t−1}
=∑
a−it−1
[
Pσ∗ψ {yit,zt|x1:t,pi1:t,s1:t,yi1:t−1,z1:t−1,ai1:t−1,a−it−1}σ∗−it (pit−1,st−1)(a−it−1)
]
by system dynamics (2)
=∑
a−it−1
P{yit,zt|xt,ait−1,a−it−1}σ∗−it (pit−1,st−1)(a−it−1)
=
Pσ∗−i{yit,zt|xt,pit−1,st−1,ait−1} = Pσ
∗
ψ {y˜it|x˜t,ait−1}.
Property (c) is true because
Eσ∗ψ
{
uit(Xt,At)|x˜1:t,ai1:t,y˜i1:t
}
=Eσ∗ψ
{
uit(Xt,At)|xt,pit,st,x˜1:t−1,ai1:t,y˜i1:t
}
=Eσ∗−iψ
{
uit(Xt,(a
i
t,σ
∗−i(pit,s−it )))|xt,pit,st,x˜1:t−1,ai1:t,y˜i1:t
}
= uit(xt,(a
i
t,σ
∗−i(pit,s−it ))) := u˜t(x˜t,a
i
t)
To establish step (ii), that is, to show that {Πt,Sit} is an information state for agent i when
he interacts with the superdynamic system defined above based on SIB assessment (σ∗, γψ), we
need to prove: (1) it can be updated recursively at t, i.e. it can be determined using {Πt−1,Sit−1}
and {Y˜ it ,Ait}={Y it ,Zt,Ait}; (2) agent i’s belief about {Πt+1,Sit+1} conditioned on {Πt,Sit,Ait} is
independent of H it and his actual strategy g
i; and (3) it is sufficient to evaluate the agent i’s
instantaneous utility at t for every action ait∈Ait, for all t∈T .
Condition (1) is satisfied since Πt = ψt(Πt−1,Zt) and Sit = φt(S
i
t−1,{Y it ,Zt,Ait}) for t∈ T \{1};
see part (i) of Definition 4 and (15).
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To prove condition (2), let
g∗jt (h
j
t) = σ
∗j
t (l(h
j
t), γ
ψ
t (ct)), (34)
for all j ∈ N and t ∈ T . Then condition (2) is satisfied since
Pσ∗ψ {sit+1,pit+1|hit,ait}=
∑
h−it ,a
−i
t
Pσ∗ψ{sit+1,pit+1,h−it ,a−it |hit,ait}
by Theorem 1 and (34)
=∑
h−it ,a
−i
t
Pσ∗ψ{sit+1,pit+1|ht,at}Pg
∗−i{h−it |hit}g∗−it (h−it )(a−it )
=∑
h−it ,a
−i
t ,s
−i
t+1
Pσ∗ψ{sit+1,pit+1,s−it+1|ht,at}Pg
∗−i{h−it |hit}g∗−it (h−it )(a−it )
by Lemma 4 and s−it = ζ
−i
t (h
−i
t ; g
∗
1:t−1) (see Definition 4)
=∑
h−it ,a
−i
t ,s
−i
t+1
Pσ∗ψ{st+1,pit+1|st,pit,at}Pg
∗−i{s−it |hit}g∗−it (h−it )(a−it )
by part (ii) of Lemma 1
=∑
s−it ,a
−i
t ,s
−i
t+1
Pσ∗ψ{st+1,pit+1|st,pit,at}P{s−it |sit,pit}g∗−it (h−it )(a−it )
by (34)
=∑
h−it ,a
−i
t ,s
−i
t+1
Pσ∗ψ{sit+1,pit+1,s−it+1|ht,at}P{s−it |sit,pit}σ∗−it (pit,s−it )(a−it )
=
Pσ∗ψ{sit+1,pit+1|sit,pit,ait}.
.
To prove condition (3), we need to show that for all ait ∈Ait,
Eg∗−i{uti(Xt,A−it ,ait)|hit}=Eg
∗−i{uti(Xt,A−it ,ait)|pit,sit}, (35)
for all hit, pit, s
i
t, t∈ T .
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By Lemma 1,
Pg∗−i{s−it |hit} = P{s−it |pit, sit}. (36)
Setting pit = γψ(ct), and A−it = σ∗−i(pit, S
−i
t ),
Eσ∗ψ {uit(Xt,A−it ,ait)|hit}=Eσ
∗
ψ {uit(Xt,σ∗−it (pit,S−it ),ait)|hit}
=Eσ∗ψ
{
Eσ∗−i{uit(Xt,σ∗−it (pit,S−it ),ait)|S−it ,pit,sti,hit}
∣∣∣hit}
=Eσ∗ψ
{
Eσ∗−i{uit(Xt,σ∗−it (pit,S−it ),ait)|S−it ,pit,sit,ct}
∣∣∣hit}
=Eσ∗−iψ
{
Eσ∗−i{uit(Xt,σ∗−it (pit,S−it ),ait)|S−it ,pit,sit,ct}
∣∣∣hit}
=Eσ∗−iψ
{
Eσ∗−i{uit(Xt,σ∗−it (pit,S−it ),ait)|S−it ,pit,sit}
∣∣∣hit}
=Eσ∗−iψ {uit(Xt,σ∗−it (pit,S−it ),ait)|pit,sit}. (37)
The first equality above is by substituting A−it = σ
∗−i
t (pit,S
−i
t ). The second equality follows
from the smoothing property of conditional expectation. The third equality holds by condition
(iii) of Definition 4. The fourth equality follows from Theorem 1 since S−it is a function of H
−i
t .
The fifth equality holds since for every xt, st, pit, ct,
P{xt|st,pit,ct}= P{xt,st|pit,ct}P{st,pit,ct} =
pit(xt,st)∑
xˆt
pit(xˆt,st)
= P{xt|st,pit}.
The last equality is true by (36). By (37) we prove condition (3) for {Πt,Sit} to be an information
state, and thus establish the result of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let (σ∗,ψ) denote a solution of the dynamic program. We note that the SIB
update rule ψ is consistent with σ∗ by requirement (25). Therefore, we only need to show that
the SIB assessment (σ∗,ψ) is sequentially rational. To prove it, we use the one-shot deviation
principle for dynamic games with asymmetric information [37]. To state the one-shot deviation,
we need the following definitions.
Definition 7 (One-shot deviation). We say g˜i is a one-shot deviation from g∗i if there exists a
unique hit∈Hi such that g˜it(hit) 6= g∗it (hit), and g˜iτ(hiτ) 6=g∗iτ (hiτ) for all hiτ 6=hit, hiτ ∈Hi.
Definition 8 (Profitable one-shot deviation). Consider an assessment (g∗,µ). We say g˜i is a
profitable one-shot deviation for agent i if g˜i is a one-shot deviation from g∗i at hit such that
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g˜it(h
i
t) 6=g∗it (hit), and
E(g∗−i,g˜i)µ
{
T∑
τ=t
uiτ(Xτ,Aτ)
∣∣∣hit
}
>E(g∗−i,g∗i)µ
{
T∑
τ=t
uiτ(Xτ,Aτ)
∣∣∣hit
}
One-shot deviation principle [37]: A consistent assessment (g∗,µ) is a PBE if and only if
there exists no agent that has a profitable one-shot deviation.
Below, we show that the consistent SIB assessment (σ∗,ψ) satisfies the sequential rationality
condition using the one-shot deviation principle.
Consider an arbitrary agent i∈N , time t∈ T , and history realization hit∈Hit. Agent i has a
profitable one-shot deviation at hit only if
σ∗it (pit,s
i
t) /∈ arg max
g˜it(h
i
t)∈∆(Ait)
Eσ∗pi
{
U¯ it((σ
∗(pit,St)),St,pit,Vt+1,ψt+1)
∣∣∣hit} .
Given (pit,Vt+1,ψt+1,σ∗t ), the expected value of the function U¯
i
t conditioned on h
i
t is only a
function of sit, agent i’s belief about S
−i
t , as well as agent i’s strategy g˜it(h
i
t). Agent i’s belief
about S−it given hit is only a function of s
i
t and pit (see (17)). Therefore, any solution to the
maximization problem above can be written as a function of pit and sit, that is, it is a SIB strategy
σ˜it(pit,s
i
t) for agent i. Consequently, agent i has a profitable one-shot deviation only if
σ∗it (pit,s
i
t) /∈ arg max
σ˜it(pit,s
i
t)∈∆(Ait)
Eσ∗pi
{
U¯ it((σ
∗(pit,St)),St,pit,Vt+1,ψt+1)
∣∣∣pit,sit}.
By (24), σ∗t is BNE of the stage game Gt(pit, Vt+1, ψt+1) at t (see also (21)), i.e.
σ∗it (pit,s
i
t)∈ arg max
σ˜it(pit,s
i
t)∈∆(Ait)
Eσ∗pi
{
U¯ it((σ
∗(pit,St)),St,pit,Vt+1,ψt+1)
∣∣∣pit,sit}.
Consequently, there exists no profitable deviation from σ∗it (pit,s
i
t) at h
i
t. Therefore, there exists
no agent that has a profitable one-shot deviation. Hence, by one-shot deviation principle, the
consistent SIB assessment (σ∗,ψ) is sequentially rational, and thus, it is a SIB-PBE.
Proof of Lemma 2. We prove below that if Vt+1(·,st+1) is continuous in pit+1, then the dynamic
program has a solution at stage t, t ∈ T ; that is, there exists at least one σ∗t such that σ∗t ∈
BNEt(Vt+1,ψt+1), where ψt+1 is consistent with σ∗t .
For every pit, define a perturbation of the stage game Gt(pit,Vt+1,ψt+1) by restricting the set of
strategies of each agent to mixed strategies that assign probability of at least  > 0 to every action
ait ∈Ait of agent i ∈N ; for every agent i ∈N we denote this class of -restricted strategies by
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Σi,t and Σt := Σ
1,
t ×. . .×ΣN,t . In the following we prove that, for every  > 0, the corresponding
perturbed stage game has an equilibrium σ∗,t along with a consistent update rule ψt+1.
We note that when the agents’ equilibrium strategies are perfectly mixed strategies, then the
update rule ψt+1 is completely determined via Bayes’ rule. Therefore, for every strategy profile
σ∗,t ∈ Σt we can write ψt+1 := βt+1(σ∗,), where βt+1(σ∗,) is Bayes’ rule where σ∗, is utilized
(see (12))
For every agent i∈N , define a best response correspondence BRi,t : Σt⇒Σi,t as
BRi,t (σ
∗,
t ) :=
{
σit∈Σi,t :σit(pit,sit)∈arg max
σi,t ∈Σi,t
Eσ
∗−i,
t ,σ
i,
t{U¯ it(At,St,pit,Vt+1,βt+1(σ∗,t ))|sit,pit},∀pit,sit
}
, (38)
which determines the set of all agent i’s best responses within the class of -restricted strategies
assuming that agents −i are playing σ∗−i,t and the update rule ψt+1 = βt+1(σ∗,t ).
For every i∈N and σ∗,∈Σt, we prove below that BRi,t (σ∗,t ) is non-empty, convex, closed,
and upper hemicontinuous.
We note that
Eσ
∗,
t ,σ
i,
t {U¯ it(At,St,pit,Vt+1,βt+1(σ∗,t ))|sit,pit}
=
∑
ait
Eσ
∗−i,
t ,A
i
t=a
i
t{U¯ it(At,St,pit,Vt+1,βt+1(σ∗,t ))|sit,pit}σi,t (pit,sit)(ait)
=
∑
ait
U˜∗,
pit,sit
(ait)σ
i,
t (pit,s
i
t)(a
i
t),
where
U˜σ
∗,
pit,sit
(ait) :=Eσ
∗−i,
t ,A
i
t=a
i
t{U¯ it(At,St,pit,Vt+1,βt+1(σ∗,t ))|sit,pit}.
Therefore, for every pit,sit, we have
σi,t (pit,s
i
t)∈ arg max
α∈∆(Ait):α(ait)≥,∀ait
∑
ait
U˜σ
∗,
pit,sit
(ait)α(a
i
t).
We note that maxα∈∆(Ait):α(ait)≥,∀ait
∑
ait
U˜σ
∗,
pit,sit
(ait)α(a
i
t) is a linear program, thus, by Theorem 16
of [38], the set of agent i’s best responses BRi,t (σ
∗,
t ) is closed and convex. If Vt+1 is continuous
in pit+1 then Vt+1 is continuous in agent i’s strategy σit. Moreover, the instantaneous utility u
i
t
is continuous in agent i’s strategy σit. Therefore, U¯
i
t , given by (20), is continuous in agent i’
strategy σit. Therefore, by the maximum theorem [39] the set of i’s best responses in upper
November 23, 2018 DRAFT
40
hemicontinuous in σ∗,t and non-empty.
Consequently, we establish that for every i ∈ N , BRi,t (σ∗,t ) is closed, convex, upper hemi-
continuous, and non-empty for every σ∗,t ∈ Σt. Define BRt :=×i∈N BRi,t where× denotes
the Cartesian product. The correspondence BRt(σ
∗,
t ) is closed, convex, upper hemicontinuous,
and non-empty for every σ∗,t ∈ Σt since BRi,t (σ∗,t ) is closed, convex, upper hemicontinuous,
and non-empty for every σ∗i,t ∈Σi,t for all i∈N . Therefore, by Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem
[40, Corollary 15.3], the correspondence BRt has a fixed point. Therefore, every perturbed stage
game has an equilibrium σ∗,t along with a consistent update rule ψt+1 = βt+1(σ
∗,
t ).
Now consider the sequence of these perturbed games when → 0. Since the set of agents’
strategies is compact, there exists a subsequence of these perturbed games whose equilibrium
strategies converge, say to σ∗t . Similarly let ψ
∗
t+1 denote the convergence point of βt+1(σ
∗,
t ). We
note that ψ∗t+1 is consistent with σ
∗
t since βt+1(σ
∗,
t ) (i.e. Bayes’ rule) is continuous in σ
∗,
t . We
show below that for every agent i∈N , σ∗it is a best response for him given Vt+1,ψ∗t+1 when he
chooses his strategy from the unconstrained class of SIB strategies.
As we proved above, the set of agent i’s best responses BRit(σ∗t ) is upper hemicontinuous
and closed given ψ∗t+1. Therefore, σ
∗
t (pit,·) is also a best response for agent i in the stage game
Gt(pit,Vt+1,ψ
∗
t+1). Consequently, σ
∗
t ∈BNEt(Vt+1, ψ∗t+1) where ψ∗t+1 is consistent with σ∗t .
Proof of Theorem 4. We have a Bayesian zero-sum game with finite state and action spaces.
By [41, Theorem 1] the equilibrium payoff is a continuous function of the agents’ common
prior/belief. Using this result, we prove, by backward induction, that every stage of the dynamic
program described by (24)-(26), has a solution and Vt is continuous in pit for all t.
For t= T +1 the dynamic program has a solution trivially since the agents have utility for
time less than or equal to T . Moreover, VT+1(., .)= 0 is trivially continuous in piT+1.
For t≤T , assume that Vt+1 is continuous in pit+1. Then, by Lemma 2 the dynamic program
has a solution at t. We note that the continuation game from t to T is a dynamic zero-sum
game with finite state and actions spaces. Therefore, as we argued above, by [41, Theorem 1]
the agents’ equilibrium payoff at t (i.e. Vt) is unique and is continuous in the agents’ common
prior given by pit.
Therefore, by induction we establish the assertion of Theorem 4.
Proof of Lemma 3. Assume that ψ1:T is independent of σ. Then, the evolution of Πt is in-
dependent of σ∗ and known a priori. As a result, we can ignore the consistency condition
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(25) in the dynamic program. Given ψt+1, the stage game Gt(pit,Vt+1,ψt+1) is a static game of
incomplete information with finite actions (given by A1:Nt ) and finite types (given by S1:Nt ) for
every pit. Therefore, by the standard existence results for finite games [30, Theorem 1.1], there
exists an equilibrium for the stage game BNEt(Vt+1,ψt+1). Consequently, the correspondence
BNEt(Vt+1,ψt+1) is non-empty for every t∈ T , thus, the dynamic programming given by (24-
26) has a solution.
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